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Abstract: End-to-End (E2E) packet delivery in the Internet is achieved through a system 
of interconnections between heterogeneous entities called Autonomous Systems (ASes). 
The initial pattern of AS interconnection in the Internet was relatively simple, involving 
mainly ISPs with a balanced mixture of inbound and outbound traffic. Changing market 
conditions and industrial organization of the Internet have jointly forced interconnections 
and associated contracts to become significantly more diverse and complex. The diversity 
of interconnection contracts is significant because efficient allocation of costs and 
revenues across the Internet value chain impacts the profitability of the industry. Not 
surprisingly, the challenges of recovering the fixed and usage-sensitive costs of network 
transport give rise to more complex settlements mechanisms than the simple bifurcated  
(transit and peering) model described in many earlier analyses of Internet interconnection 
(see BESEN et al., 2001; GREENSTEIN, 2005; or LAFFONT et al., 2003). In the 
following, we provide insight into recent operational developments, explaining why 
interconnection in the Internet has become more complex, the nature of interconnection 
bargaining processes, the implications for cost/revenue allocation and hence 
interconnection incentives, and what this means for public policy. This paper offers an 
abbreviated version of the original paper (see FARATIN et al., 2007b). 
Key words: internet interconnection, economics, public policy, routing, peering. 
he Internet was designed so that different providers could operate 
different parts of the network. Today, the Internet is built up out of 
regions, or Autonomous Systems (ASes) that include commercial 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), corporations and other enterprise 
providers, universities, government agencies, and (more recently) content 
providers and other specialized service providers. This design results in a 
network of networks that, like any distributed supply-chain, requires 
competitors to cooperate to deliver a coherent end-to-end service. In today's 
Internet this state of "coopetition" takes the form of rich interconnection 
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among ASes such that networks carry each other's traffic to reach final 
destinations.  
In the beginning, the pattern of AS interconnection somewhat resembled 
a simple hierarchy, with campuses and other geographically local networks 
connecting to regional networks, and the regional network connecting (in the 
U.S.) to a single government-subsidized NSF backbone. The pattern of 
interconnections that emerged in the commercial Internet in the mid-1990s is 
relatively more complex, comprised of many networks connected among 
themselves and to multiple interconnected backbones (so-called "Tier 1" 
providers, as we will define below), governed by market-based contracts that 
are negotiated on a bilateral basis. This evolution was enabled by 
infrastructure innovation toward higher capacity switching and transmission 
links and new routing protocols. 
The pattern of interconnection may be viewed conceptually as the result 
of a complex, dynamic bargaining game between pairs of ASes. The 
outcome of this bargaining game is important because the choice of 
interconnections determines not only reachability but also performance 
features such as the scope of routing capabilities (e.g., how many diverse 
routes are available and the quality or congestion experienced along those 
routes). However, these bargaining games are fraught with potential 
breakdowns due to either transaction costs and/or to agency/opportunism 
problems. For instance, it is often unclear who should pay whom for 
interconnection on the Internet. It is not possible to deduce the direction of 
"value flow" by looking at the direction of packet flow.  
Given the simultaneous benefits of interconnections, two simple 
standardized types of bilateral contracts for AS interconnection emerged in 
the early commercialization of the Internet: peering and transit. A peering
agreement (also called "Bill and Keep" or "Sender Keeps All") is where two 
networks provide access only to each other's customers for no financial 
settlements. In contrast, transit is where one network provides reachability to 
the entire Internet in return for a monetary settlement. The recursive 
combination of these standardized bilateral peering and transit contracts 
created the complex web of interconnections wherein networks become 
resellers of transport and peer with one another in what has been a mutually 
beneficial and hence largely stable manner.  
Previous academic work on the incentives of network operators to 
interconnect has focused either on direct externality effects 
(NEUCHTERLEIN & WEISER, 2005) or agency models (MILGROM, D. CLARK et al. 53 
MITCHELL & SRINAGESH, 2000). In contrast, this paper focuses on the 
emerging interconnection bargaining practices involving heterogeneous 
ASes.  
The goal of this paper is to provide insight into this rich and complex 
operating environment, to suggest some of the ways that interconnection is 
changing and will continue to change, and to trace the implications for future 
Internet architecture, industry structure, and public policy. 1
We will focus on a single Internet service, namely content (web) delivery: 
first, because content accounts for a large portion of today's Internet traffic 
and second, because interconnection and settlement mechanisms and 
strategies are being increasingly influenced by the emergence of large 
sources of web content and very large aggregators of residential broadband 
customers -- the DSL and cable ISPs, each with asymmetric patterns of 
traffic (almost all traffic is outbound from the server and inbound to the 
consumer). These large networks are substantial-enough players that their 
interests are changing Internet interconnection bargaining processes and 
giving rise to greater reliance on more complex contracting variants such as 
paid-peering and partial transit. 2 We will also show how a system limited to 
bilateral transfers fails to send relevant price signals that can be used to 
internalize potential indirect externalities across complementary distinct 
markets, leading to closure of viable markets. This market failure is partially 
responsible for the entry by third-party application layer content distribution 
networks, and other overlay models of content delivery.
  Settlement-free peering and transit introduced 
The entities that are interconnected are referred to as Autonomous 
Systems (ASes). As of October 2008, there were over 29,000 in use (ASN, 
2008). Most ASes are ISPs, but they also include enterprises, governmental 
or educational institutions, and increasingly large content providers with 
mostly outbound traffic such as Google, Yahoo, and YouTube as well as 
overlay content distribution networks such as Akamai and Limelight (CLARK 
1 This paper is an abbreviated version of an earlier version (see FARATIN et al, 2007b). 
2 We owe Scott Marcus for pointing out that partial transit and paid peering contracts are not 
new in the Internet, but have been in use for over a decade. What is new is the trend toward 
increased reliance on such contracts.  54     No. 72, 4
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et al, 2005). An autonomous system is also sometimes referred to as a 
routing domain. ASes manage pools of IP addresses. For each AS, the 
"cone of prefixes" refers to addresses that terminate either in that AS or on 
other ASes that it has sold transit to (which recursively includes any 
addresses of customers of those ASes, and so on).  
Transit
ASes may interconnect with each other in several ways. For example, an 
ISP A may enter into an interconnection agreement with an ISP X wherein 
ISP A pays ISP X to tell the rest of the Internet about "where" A is (which is 
called "announcing its prefixes") and ISP X agrees to send and receive 
traffic between A and the rest of the Internet. This form of agreement is 
called full transit, and is equivalent to saying that "A is a customer of X".   
X either has access to all global Internet addresses or else in turn 
purchases access from another AS that has more extensive access. Each 
AS will have been allocated one or more address prefixes for its use, but if it 
provides transit service to another ISP, it must also take responsibility for 
announcing the prefixes of its customers. This relationship is recursive. A 
small AS A could purchase transit service from a medium sized AS M, which 
in turn could purchase transit service from X. 
If A purchases transit service from X, then A can have a very simple 
forwarding table. It needs only two classes of AS-level entries: its own 
prefixes and "everywhere else". For its own prefixes, it will use its intra-AS 
routing protocols to forward the packet internal to the AS. For "everywhere 
else", it just sends the packet to X. This sort of forwarding entry is called a 
"default route". When A purchases transit from X, X must make sure that all 
the ISPs know that X is the path to the prefixes of A, but A need not concern 
itself with where all the other prefixes are. It just sends the traffic to X.  
Any AS can choose to purchase transit from more than one provider. 
They might do this, for example, to obtain more diverse and resilient access 
to the Internet (called multi-homing). When an AS does this, its addresses 
become part of the prefix cone of all of their transit providers.  
Generally, full transit pricing is subject to substantial volume discounts. 
To get an idea of what levels of transit pricing look like (while recognizing 
that the variation in what ISPs pay varies widely across agreements and D. CLARK et al. 55 
around the globe), the table below summarizes data gathered from a sample 
of 42 ASes in 2006: 3
Table 1 - NANOG 2006 Transit Survey 
Survey Sample Size  42 
Average Monthly Price  $25/Mbps 
Maximum Price  $95/Mbps 
Minimum Price  $10/Mbps 
Average Commit Levels  1440 Mbps 
Transit contracts are enforceable and the customer usually receives a 
service level agreement (SLA) to ensure appropriate quality of service and 
reliability. This will include commitments to repair and restore service after 
failures, as well as performance commitments under normal operation. 
Settlement free peering 
Another common form of Internet interconnection agreement is peering.
In a peering agreement, X and Y interconnect, but only for the purpose of 
providing a path between their two cones of prefixes. In the original model of 
peering, called settlement free peering, there was no payment between X 
and Y for this arrangement.  
The so-called Tier 1 ISPs are the set of ASes that do not purchase transit 
from any other AS, and thus must peer with every other Tier 1 ISP. The Tier 
1 ISPs collectively form a complete mesh of peering arrangements. Tier 1 
ISPs are large, with global scope. They do not peer at only one physical 
location, but at a number of points around the globe. Since a Tier 1 AS does 
not purchase transit, it cannot take advantage of a default route. Together, 
the Tier 1 ISPs define the "Global Routing Table" (GRT), which lists every 
single prefix on the Internet, the different available paths to that prefix, and 
other information that lets the AS make forwarding choices based on the 
available paths.  
All Tier 1 ISPs must peer with each other, but the use of peering is not 
restricted to Tier 1 ASes. Any two ISPs can choose to peer with each other, 
by mutual agreement. Two small ASes that discover that they have a lot of 
traffic for each other might decide to create a direct peering connection 
rather than sending the traffic up to their transit providers, which would not 
3 This data was collected by B. Norton in 2006 from 42 surveyed ASes at the 36
th Peering Birds 
of a Feather at North American Network Operator’s Group (NANOG) (see NORTON, 2006).56     No. 72, 4
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only increase the load and thus (often) the cost of their transit service, but 
also lead to packet delivery performance degradation because of longer 
latencies caused by longer paths.  
Because peering is cost saving it exhibits a number of ex-ante (see 
NORTON, 2003) and ex-post opportunism/agency problems (see 
MILGROM, MITCHELL & SRINAGESH, 2000). Therefore peering 
agreements often have a number of requirements, including: 
x Geographic Diversity: Many networks require potential peering 
partners to set up links in multiple, geographically diverse locations.  
x Traffic Volume: If A requests settlement free peering from Z, Z will 
measure its traffic to/from A. If the volume is small, Z will deny the request. 
The traffic volume requirement in each network's peering policy is usually 
based on the size of the network.  
x Traffic Ratio: In settlement free peering relationships with very large 
networks, there is frequently a requirement to keep traffic "in ratio". The 
traffic going from A to Z is measured, and the traffic going from Z to A is 
measured. If the two numbers are not close enough, peering will be denied. 
For very large networks, the traffic ratio requirement is usually 2:1, and 
sometimes 1.5:1.
x Consistent Announcements: Most networks require peers to maintain 
consistent Border Gateway Protocol ("BGP") announcements across all 
peering links.  This simply means that the BGP announcements should be 
identical, modulo irrelevant location-specific details, on every BGP session 
between the two networks. 4
x Marketing considerations: Many ISPs will refuse to peer with an ISP 
that is a customer or a potential customer, as we discuss below. 
Over time, as interconnection has become more strategic, peering 
requirements have become more complex, formal, and detailed. 
4 Consistent announcements allow a peer to hot potato traffic, inconsistent announcements 
force a peer to cold potato traffic.  Assume A and B peer, and A only announces west coast 
prefixes on west coast peering points, and the same for east coast.  If B has a packet in New 
York for A, B must carry the packet to the west coast where B sees the prefix announced.  If B 
is announcing consistently to A, A can pass the return packets to B on the west coast.  This 
shifts costs from A to B. D. CLARK et al. 57 
History of internet interconnection 
Historically, the major distinction among different ISPs was their size. 
Size could be measured in a number of ways, including: geographic scope, 
total rates of traffic across the boundaries, or the number of attached 
customers.  Although ISPs differed in size and coverage area, most were 
approximately similar with respect to the types of services they offered and 
(size aside) with respect to their incentives to interconnect. These relatively 
symmetric incentives to interconnect were important in shaping the 
environment in which interconnection agreements evolved in the early days 
of the commercial Internet.  
The idea of symmetry among ISPs of similar size emerged as follows. In 
the backbone, the presumption of symmetric costs among approximately 
symmetrically sized "peers" meant that when network A delivered a packet 
received from network B to customers in its cone of prefixes, it was 
reasonable to believe that the costs of that delivery were approximately 
similar to the costs incurred by network B when it delivered a packet 
received from network A to customers in its cone of prefixes. If the costs are 
similar, the traffic is balanced and by some estimate the networks host equal 
numbers of users, then it could be argued that the benefit of interconnection 
was similar to both parties. Second, since the costs of constructing and 
operating a data network are mostly traffic insensitive (and associated with 
maintaining the network's peak load capacity), the incremental costs of 
delivery were presumed to be relatively small. In conjunction with the first 
point, this implies that total network costs could be reduced if usage-
sensitive metering were largely dispensed with, resulting in settlement free 
(revenue neutral) peering among similar sized backbone providers.  
In contrast, the assumption of symmetric delivery costs seems less 
applicable when a large network exchanges traffic with a small network. In 
an uncongested state, a typical packet that originates on a network with 
smaller geographic scope and ends up on the larger network might be 
expected to impose higher delivery costs on the larger network (which must 
typically carry the packet a greater distance). A larger network would 
presumably have more customers, and this might be seen as giving the 
larger network more value because of the larger positive network 
externalities associated with being part of their networks. Taken together, 
these effects may have contributed to the perception that size contributed to 58     No. 72, 4
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a network's bargaining position. 5 In any case, smaller networks tended to 
negotiate transit agreements with one or more larger providers under which 
the smaller networks agreed to pay the larger providers to deliver their 
traffic.  
In this earlier world of peering (among networks of the same size) and 
transit (between large and small networks), although ASes might differ with 
respect to size, in other respects, they were remarkably similar and 
symmetric in their overall incentives and view of the interconnection 
problem.  
  The erosion of homogeneity 
Over time and with the growth of Internet traffic, the idea that ISPs of a 
certain size were more or less the same has eroded. We have seen the 
emergence of "eyeball" heavy broadband access networks such as Verizon, 
AT&T or Comcast, on the one hand, and "content" heavy networks such as 
Abovenet or Cogent (that host a lot of content servers) and large content-
providers such as Google and Yahoo. These networks have asymmetric 
traffic flows. Users on eyeball networks send small requests to content 
servers on content networks, while the servers on a content network send 
large replies. The "eyeball" customers want the content since that is part of 
the reason they pay for broadband service; the content networks need the 
eyeballs because that is what they sell to advertisers and the "eye balls" are 
the end-users who may subscribe directly to pay-to-view content. Thus, 
there are demand complementarities across distinct end-host markets 
(content providers and consumers) who are customers of ASes. Such 
markets also exhibit strong indirect externalities, where consumption by one 
side of the market increases as the consumption of the other market grows.  
The question of who should pay whom to recover the costs of supporting 
that interconnection is ambiguous in this asymmetric world.  
5 The relative strength of the bargaining position of ISPs, even in the early days, was 
ambiguous with respect to size. While the positive network externalities associated with joining 
a large network are larger in aggregate, there were many backbone providers and the 
incremental benefits of larger size decrease with size. In section 4 we discuss the apparent shift 
in the bargaining positions over time.  D. CLARK et al. 59 
We observe in practice that most content-heavy networks are more open 
in their peering policies than are most eyeball-heavy networks. We can 
speculate on a number of reasons for this difference: 
x  As opposed to early access networks where switching costs for 
consumers were insignificant (because they could call any local modem 
bank ISP), modern broadband consumers may feel that switching costs are 
relatively higher, assuming they even have a choice of providers. Therefore 
eyeball networks may perceive that they have some increased bargaining 
power because they "own" the eyeballs.  
x  Eyeball networks believe that the "natural" direction of value flow is 
toward them, rather than away from them. The growth of Internet advertising 
suggests that content-providers place high value on reaching end-users on 
eyeball networks.   
x  The last-mile networks of the broadband eyeball networks are more 
capital intensive, often involving "lumpy" investments, than are the long-haul 
and backbone networks of content-providers.6 Consequently, the cost 
recovery challenge of the last-mile networks is greater (although as noted 
earlier, it is not clear that their incremental costs for delivery are higher). 
For these sorts of reasons, we observe that even small eyeball-heavy 
networks might sometimes refuse to peer with a much larger content-heavy 
network, and this has fueled the move toward more complex forms of 
interconnection contracts.  
Paid peering 
Paid Peering, sometimes called "Settlement Based Peering," is identical 
to settlement free peering in terms of how prefixes are announced and traffic 
is forwarded. What differs is that the traffic is no longer exchanged without 
payment. If an eyeball provider is not prepared to offer settlement-free 
peering to a content provider, then the traditional interconnection 
agreements offer few options, none of which is a good solution. These 
include: 
6 The distinction is analogous to the lower capital intensity of long distance telephone service 
relative to local telephone service. The fact that the long distance network shared the local 
access network was used to help justify long distance services subsidizing local telephone 
services to help recover the fixed costs (non-traffic sensitive) of last-mile infrastructure.  60     No. 72, 4
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x  If the eyeball network has a very strong bargaining position, it might 
try to force the content provider to purchase transit service from the eyeball 
network. However, apart from cost, the content provider may not need 
access to all of the Internet, but only to the cone of prefixes that belong to 
the eyeball network. 
x  Both the eyeball network and the content network can purchase 
transit from third parties, in which case both are worse off, and the third 
parties are the only beneficiaries.  
x  If the eyeball network already peers with some third network, the 
content network can negotiate a transit arrangement with that third network. 
Again, in this case, only the third network is better off.  
Paid peering may offer an alternative that leaves both parties better off 
than any of the above options.  Paid peering can be either paying for all bits 
flowing over the interconnect, or just a negotiated rate for the traffic over the 
agreed ratio. 
In fact, settlement free peering arose as a defensible approximation only 
in the context of assumed symmetry in value flow. If the difference in actual 
value were small, bargaining costs would swamp the benefits of negotiating 
a price. However, once the assumption of symmetric value starts to break 
down, the binary world of transit and settlement free peering will break down.
Partial transit 
The second new type of interconnection agreement that is growing in 
importance is Partial Transit. Under partial transit, a network Z sells access 
to and/or from a subset of the Internet prefixes to another network A or Z 
which sells transit with some service restriction. For instance, Z may sell A 
only the ability to send traffic to part of the Internet, but not receive traffic. (In 
other words, A can behave like a content network but not like an eyeball 
network.) The reverse may also hold – A may be allowed to receive traffic 
but not send traffic. In this relationship, A will pay Z, but the price for partial 
transit will usually be less than half the cost of a comparable amount of full 
transit.  
Partial transit agreements are a response to two competing commercial 
pressures. For example, providers with significant amounts of asymmetric in-
bound traffic have a strong incentive to sell the outbound capacity on links 
for which the set-up costs have already been committed. Partial transit can D. CLARK et al. 61 
also be used strategically to help a network balance peering ratios to allow 
them to stay in conformance with their peering agreements.  
Networks also frequently sell access only to valuable peering 
relationships. If M and N peer, then M might consider selling partial transit to 
A but only to get to N. In this way, the partial transit agreement operates as a 
form of arbitrage that expands the range of networks that may participate 
(even if only indirectly) in peering agreements with large providers.  
Summary 
Taken together, the expansion of paid peering and partial transit 
interconnection agreements represent a filling in of the contract space. 
Instead of a choice of two (relatively) standardized agreements that neatly 
mapped to networks based on their relative size (i.e., similar sized networks 
might peer, but large networks charged small networks for transit), the world 
is moving towards a continuum of contract types. The drivers for this include 
the growing heterogeneity and sheer size of the Internet, as well as the 
bifurcation of the large networks by symmetry type as well as by size. The 
expansion of contract types may be viewed as a rational expansion in choice 
to accommodate the greater diversity of needs. This is consistent with 
market competition forcing participants to innovate towards more efficient 
cost-saving contracts. Viewed in this light, these new contracts may be 
interpreted as an efficiency-enhancing outcome. Paid peering allows 
providers who otherwise would fail to negotiate peering to better accomplish 
their interconnection objectives. And, partial transit represents a way to 
make transit more like peering, allowing flexibility in the scope of termination 
commitments in return for greater flexibility in payment terms as well as the 
benefits of enforceable contracts. 
The welfare effects of these emerging contracts are nonetheless 
ambiguous. Presumptively, under the assumption of efficient bargaining, the 
fact that the parties mutually agree to adopt these new contracting forms in 
preference to simpler forms suggests that the movement to these contracts 
ought to be welfare enhancing. On the other hand, if bargaining is imperfect 
then the movement to these types of contracts may increase bargaining 
complexity and costs, which in turn might pose a threat of increased 
bargaining failures.62     No. 72, 4
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  Further complexity of settlement-free  
bargaining strategies 
In the following subsections, we describe some real-world negotiation 
strategies employed by ASes seeking to establish and maintain settlement-
free peering in today's more complex and heterogeneous world. 7
Refusal to peer 
Uncertainties over how to allocate (shared or standalone) costs, 
especially across multiple ASes (when multi-homed) involving different 
contracts, may raise the risks of peering bargaining failures. Many large 
networks (and some small networks) will not accept peering requests from 
smaller networks, even if there are likely to be cost or performance benefits 
for the larger network. Some of the reasons that networks may cite for 
refusing to peer include the following:  
x Do not peer with current (or potential) customers: Almost no network 
will peer with its own customers, because doing so means lost revenue. This 
also means networks will not request transit from existing peers for fear of 
losing their peering. 
x Do not peer with existing peer's customers: Stability of 
interconnections are important. For large networks that already have robust 
peering, many peering requests come from customers of existing peers. 
Providers often turn down these requests. First, while stealing transit 
customers from one another based on price or performance is normal 
business practice, in a networked economy stealing a revenue generating 
customer by agreeing to a non-revenue generating relationship is unstable 
because the peer may in turn "poach" the network's downstream customers 
asking for peering in a tit-for-tat exercise. Second, agreeing to such peering 
requests will move traffic off the original peering link, onto a direct link with 
customer. This will change traffic ratios and volumes with the original peer, 
perhaps putting the larger peering relationship in danger.  
x Inflexibility, or adherence to peering policy: When large networks 
create a peering policy, they may strictly conform to it, to avoid the risk of 
7 This paper is based, in part, on the real-world experience of some of its authors and the 
stories they have gathered. Citations to actual interconnection agreements are not possible 
since these are typically regarded as confidential and proprietary information.  D. CLARK et al. 63 
being sued. The threat of lawsuits is valid, and possible concern about anti-
trust scrutiny may apply to a few large networks. However, it is difficult, 
perhaps even impossible, to write in advance a policy that is detailed and 
complex enough to cover all the issues that may arise, so formal policies 
often preclude mutually beneficial negotiations.  
x Cost sharing: A provider will often not peer with anyone who has not 
demonstrated equal investment in infrastructure, resources, etc. The logic 
behind this includes: ensuring the peer has the ability to carry the traffic; 
ensuring the peer is capable of troubleshooting problems; and ensuring the 
peer has the same investment in the quality of traffic.  Obviously there are 
possible mutually beneficial situations where the costs are not equal, which 
this policy would preclude. 
x Perception: In the real world of bargaining, some motivations are 
purely subjective. Network engineers almost always have a large amount of 
pride in their creation. They feel the networks they created are large, 
important, and significant on a global scale. A peering request from a 
network they feel is much smaller or less important may seem to diminish 
their own importance. Peering with the smaller network might diminish their 
network in the eyes of their colleagues.  
Creating incentives to peer 
Networks who would like to peer are frequently turned down for a variety 
of reasons, including those in the previous section. The long-term benefits of 
peering (e.g., cost savings, performance enhancements, and scalability) 
drive many networks to take unintuitive or even harmful (in the short term) 
steps in order to induce potential partners to peer. Some of these strategies 
include:  
x Force traffic over (expensive) transit: Because of the reasons 
mentioned above, providers will frequently turn down peering requests from 
networks who are customers of existing peers. An obvious response for that 
customer, if they can control the routing of their traffic, is to cause their traffic 
to/from the prospective peer to route over the peer's transit connection to 
raise the peer's transit costs in order to induce it to peer. This response only 
works when the peer in question is not a Tier 1 network, since Tier 1 
networks have no transit. This response is a game of "chicken", since it may 
raise the cost for both parties.  64     No. 72, 4
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x Lower performance: If a provider refuses to peer, a network may 
direct traffic to a smaller link, or not upgrade an existing one. If the link 
reaches capacity, it will precipitate congestion, which means packet loss, 
high latency, and performance degradation. Similarly, the network may direct 
traffic through trans-oceanic lines (e.g. From London to Paris through New 
York), which increases latency and lowers throughput. Again, the basic idea 
is to raise the costs until the prospective peer agrees. And, as before, this 
strategy can raise both agents' costs.  
x Move traffic away: Most large networks do not have the majority of 
traffic sourced from or terminated on their own AS, but on the prefixes of 
their transit customers. Customer prefixes are often not single-homed, and 
hence there is more than one path to the customer. Say Network A asks to 
peer with Network Z, and Z denies the request. A may find some large 
customer of Z, C, to which A is sending a large amount of traffic through Z. It 
may be possible for A to find a second path to C. This other path may 
involve directly peering with the C, finding another transit path, or peering 
with a second transit provider of C. A special case of this strategy is called 
"doughnut peering". This is where a provider will intentionally seek out and 
peer with all of a network's downstream customers or their second transit 
provider, removing the incentive to peer with the network itself, and 
potentially harming Z through loss of revenue. 
x Cross geographic boundaries: Although most large networks will not 
peer with small or medium sized networks, a smaller network which makes a 
large investment, such as crossing an ocean to meet the larger network, 
may get an exemption to the Peering Policy of the larger network. 
x Interesting prefixes: If a network has something on its network that is 
interesting for the potential peer, this can shift the bargaining. For example, 
a network with a Root Name Server will increase its chance of peering. 
Strategies to remain in compliance with policy 
ISPs also employ multiple strategies in order to sustain settlement-free 
peering agreements. These include:  
x Traffic engineering: The term "traffic engineering" refers to the 
collection of management decisions an ISP makes, including the local 
configuration of the way the Internet routing protocol (BGP) works, to 
allocate traffic to the different paths they control. Traffic engineering 
techniques can be used to keep peering traffic ratios within balance by, for D. CLARK et al. 65 
instance, directing traffic over transit which could have been served through 
peering. 
x Buy additional services: Most network providers do not supply just full 
transit but instead have a whole portfolio of products for sale. A non-
complying partner may purchase some of these additional services as a way 
to preserve a peering relationship. 
x Incentives to customers: Some networks will offer incentives (low 
price or even free transit) to customers who will help correct a policy 
violation. It is common for large content networks to charge different prices 
to "eyeball" and "content" end-customers.  
x Threat of disconnection: If the only path to a network is over the 
peering links (i.e. neither network purchases full transit), then shutting down 
peering will cause disconnection between the two networks. This gives a 
very large incentive to continue peering. 
  Bilateral negotiations, market-failure and entry of CDNs  
As we attempted to demonstrate above, the Internet is a network of 
networks and provisioning end-to-end service involves many multiparty 
negotiation challenges. However, various entities in the Internet have learnt 
how to coordinate, albeit more inefficiently, using and designing various 
standardized bilateral contracts so as to ensure a "best-effort" service. The 
scalability and stability of end-to-end interconnections in the Internet has 
been dependent on the stability of this underlying bargaining mechanism 
that implements only a restricted set of transfers.  
However, the collective price paid for the limitations inherent in building 
an end-to-end Internet from a collection of bilateral bargains has been the 
lack of services (QoS, multicast) that might arguably benefit all, because 
values can be better internalized.  Failure to internalize realizable demand is 
best demonstrated with the entry and growth of Content Distribution 
Networks (CDNs). As noted earlier, large content providers, and at times 
content consumers, may be presumed to have a high willingness to pay for 
better than best-effort packet transport services, However, incumbent ISPs 
have consistently failed to coordinate and service this end-to-end demand. 
This market failure helped provide entry incentives for third party CDNs (see 
CLARK et al, 2005, or HOFFMAN & BEAUMONT, 2005) who invest in 
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reducing transit costs. As we have argued elsewhere CDNs in effect 
transform the single principal (the end-host content provider) multiple agent 
(packet transport ASes) coordination problem into a single-principal (the 
content provider), single agent (the CDN) who in turn becomes the single 
principal interacting with multiple agents (packet transport ASes). A CDN as 
a principal internalizes the (provisioning, monitoring and enforcing) 
transaction costs of bargaining with the transport ASes, but benefits from 
strong economies of scope and scale. 8
  Conclusions and future work 
The Internet is a network of networks, comprised of entities called 
Autonomous Systems (ASes) that are semi-autonomous administrative 
domains managed, in many cases, by commercial entities known as ISPs. 
How these ASes are interconnected influences how traffic is routed across 
the Internet, the reachability of content, and the services that can be 
supported. In addition to helping to determine the physical routing of 
packets, the business agreements by which ASes are interconnected also 
serve to route value transfers between and among ASes. 
Historically, there were two dominant types of interconnection 
agreements: settlement-free peering and transit. Interconnection can be 
roughly described by a hierarchical model in which smaller ISPs purchased 
transit from large ISPs and the largest ISPs exchanged traffic at multilateral 
(public) or, more commonly, bilateral (private) peering points. Smaller ISPs, 
if they saw mutual benefit, could also arrange peering agreements. Under 
the assumption of approximately symmetric traffic and costs, it made sense 
for similar ISPs to exchange traffic without any monetary payments. Using 
only these two types of standardized agreements, the Internet was able to 
scale and grow substantially in geographic scope, traffic volume, and 
capabilities.
The fact that the Internet has been able to scale as a network of 
competing yet cooperating networks, resulting in a relatively stable and 
robust set of interconnections, is perhaps remarkable. Of particular note is 
that this has happened in a mostly un-regulated market – in rather dramatic 
contrast to the legacy of regulation that has characterized interconnection in 
8 See FARATIN & WILKENING (2006) and FARATIN (2007a) for further discussion.  D. CLARK et al. 67 
the PSTN. With the growing commercial importance of the Internet, including 
its role as a replacement for the PSTN, it is inevitable that various parties will 
question whether the contracts and mechanisms that have sustained 
interconnection in the Internet to date will be sufficient to sustain stable 
interconnection in the future.  
The goal of this paper is to provide a richer view of what real-world 
Internet interconnection looks like, relying in part on contributions from 
industry practitioners with deep knowledge of what negotiating 
interconnection looks like on the ground. With the growth of the Internet the 
diversity of ASes has expanded and the presumption of symmetry has 
eroded. New types of providers such as content-heavy ISPs such as 
Abovenet and Cogent and large content providers like Google, Yahoo, and 
YouTube are interacting with ever-larger eye-ball heavy ISPs like Comcast 
and Verizon. New types of players like Akamai and Limelight are providing 
overlay services. These changes lead to traffic patterns that are highly 
asymmetric, as traffic flows from content to eyeball, and also lead to 
changing perceptions regarding the symmetry of value flows. In response to 
this growth and resultant changes in the Internet industry landscape, the 
range of interconnection contracts have expanded to include greater reliance 
on paid peering and partial transit, reflecting a filling in of the contracting 
space. 
What this implies for the future of Internet Interconnection is unclear. 
There is little evidence, aside from a few highly visible events such as de-
peering actions, that the range of negotiated contracts, whether 
discriminatory or not, has harmed the overall connectivity of the Internet. 
Most users seldom encounter an event where a failure to negotiate an 
interconnection agreement (as opposed to a failure of a link or a router) 
keeps them from reaching some part of the network. If there is a failure 
today, it will be found not in a lack of reachability, but in the failure of certain 
sorts of providers and services to emerge in the market, potentially due in 
part to the lack of appropriate mechanisms to manage value flows. Further, 
as the CDN example demonstrated, under some circumstances such 
failures may be alleviated by third party entrants with incentives to internalize 
potential value-flows from indirect externalities. The discovery of additional 
hypothetical failures would require more work than we have been able to 
undertake. However, it is worth considering the possibility that different sorts 
of value flows (e.g. from the advertiser toward the consumer) might help to 
increase the penetration of consumer uptake of broadband by reducing the 
cost of broadband access. Advertising subsidizes the media industry, so it is 68     No. 72, 4
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not intrinsically inappropriate to ask whether such an outcome could also 
happen in the Internet.  
We also have a cautionary conclusion: if one should be motivated (for 
whatever reason) to contemplate some regulatory rule to manage 
interconnection, the design of such a rule will be both complex and 
informationally demanding. Partial transit and paid peering may be seen as 
efficiency-enhancing responses to changing market conditions. While there 
may be opportunities for abuse by providers with excessive bargaining 
power, the complexity of what is in place today, and what seems to be 
working today, would argue that the best way to address any potential 
concern would be to focus on the sources of bargaining power and identify 
anti-competitive opportunism, rather than to impose ex ante restrictions on 
the range of bilateral contracts.  
Other actions, both by industry and academia, could be contemplated. 
For example, it is clear that the commonly understood, "old-fashioned" 
model of peering and transit reduced bargaining costs, which is efficiency 
enhancing. If it were possible to bring a "best practice" or "common practice" 
in interconnection out from the non-disclosure agreement and into the light, 
this might also help reduce bargaining costs, but in a more flexible way than 
might be achieved via regulatory constraints. An industry forum that tried to 
discuss this openly (and which was given a clear mandate for how to behave 
so as to avoid anti-trust concerns) might offer a substantial contribution to 
efficient operation of this asymmetric world, and might mitigate the sorts of 
fears that have prompted calls for more direct regulation. Neutral 
development of cost models and hypothetical value flow might inform such a 
forum. Lack of real data and available cost models hinder any academic 
contribution to the efficiency of this process.  
For the future, the growth of multimedia traffic, including delay-intolerant 
applications such as voice-over-IP (VoIP), will imply a growing need for 
differentiated quality of service (QoS) to accommodate the requirements of 
different types of traffic. The lack of QoS support in the legacy "best efforts" 
Internet has quite possibly hindered the emergence of some applications 
that demand enhanced services, and the ability to cache content enabled 
innovation in content distribution and facilitated the rise of Content 
Distribution Networks. We can speculate that there may be new sorts of 
applications that cannot be supported using CDNs or built by exploiting 
application-level interconnection with other kinds of networks such as the 
PSTN. In order for such applications to emerge, the community of ASes will 
need to coordinate and provision better end-to-end services. Tier 1 ASes D. CLARK et al. 69 
have begun to implement interprovider QoS over peering links to support 
VoIP. Interconnections are also emerging for interprovider VPNs, 
developments that may signal the need for more efficient coordination and 
contracting mechanisms by ASes, perhaps as packet-transport continues to 
become a commodity market.  70     No. 72, 4
th Q. 2008 
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